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Abstract
What might sound like the beginning of a joke has become an attractive prospect for
many cognitive scientists: the use of deep neural network models (DNNs) as models
of human behavior in perceptual and cognitive tasks. Although DNNs have taken
over machine learning, attempts to use them as models of human behavior are still in
the early stages. Can they become a versatile model class in the cognitive scientist’s
toolbox? We first argue why DNNs have the potential to be interesting models of
human behavior. We then discuss how that potential can be more fully realized. On
the one hand, we argue that the cycle of training, testing, and revising DNNs needs
to be revisited through the lens of the cognitive scientist’s goals. Specifically, we
argue that methods for assessing the goodness of fit between DNN models and human
behavior have to date been impoverished. On the other hand, cognitive science might
have to start using more complex tasks (including richer stimulus spaces), but doing so
might be beneficial for DNN-independent reasons as well. Finally, we highlight avenues
where traditional cognitive process models and DNNs may show productive synergy.
Highlights
• Like their predecessors – connectionist models – DNNs should be taken seriously as
candidate models of behavior.
• DNN models of behavior would ideally be trained in two stages: ecological pre-training
and training on diagnostic tasks. Possibly a third, consisting of limited fitting to
behavioral data.
• For evaluating the goodness of fit of a DNN, just like of any model, as rich as possible
a characterization of behavior should be used. Reaction times and learning trajectories
are underused for this purpose.
• The computational power of DNNs should stimulate the development of more complex
human tasks, which can then also pose new challenges for cognitive process models.
• Hybrids of cognitive process models and DNNs offer new opportunities.
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1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) currently dominate machine learning. Since their break-
through performance in visual object recognition (Krizhevsky, Sutskever, & Hinton, 2012),
they are approaching or surpassing human performance across a wide range of complex
real-world tasks (LeCun, Bengio, & Hinton, 2015). Increased computational power and the
availability of large-scale data sets have made it possible to train more complex (e.g., deeper)
models. In addition, the neural network toolkit has been expanded by new computational
building blocks like attention (Vaswani et al., 2017), graph neural networks (Battaglia et
al., 2018), read/write memory (Graves, Wayne, & Danihelka, 2014), and the fusion with
probabilistic modeling (Kingma & Welling, 2013; Rezende, Mohamed, & Wierstra, 2014).
To machine learners, human performance often serves merely as a benchmark for deep
neural network (see Glossary) performance, and making DNNs behave similarly to humans
is not their goal. However, in recent years, DNNs have attracted the attention of cognitive
scientists and cognitive neuroscientists, who would like to turn them into good models of
human behavior and neural activity. For them, the performance of a DNN on a task is
not interesting in itself. Having a DNN that behaves at or above human levels is only the
starting point for digging deeper: can the network account quantitatively for the richness of
human behavior across task conditions and task parameters?
As deep neural network models are entering the cognitive science toolkit, it is worthwhile
to formulate a research strategy through which DNNs could become more valuable models of
human behavior across a range of tasks, and challenges faced by this strategy. In particular,
cognitive scientists should not blindly adopt the training and testing methodologies of DNNs
from machine learning, since those were developed with different goals in mind.
In this paper, we attempt to formulate conditions under which DNN models could be-
come interesting and relevant models of human behavior for cognitive science and cognitive
neuroscience. How should we train and test DNN models? How do DNN models compare
and contrast with the cognitive process models that are the bread and butter of cognitive
science? We start by addressing two obvious criticisms one could have of the broad research
agenda (Section 2). Then, we introduce the running thread of this paper: the metaphor of
a neural network that - like a human participant - walks into the cognitive science lab to be
studied by a cognitive scientist (see Figure 1).
A human participant entering a lab experiment has already been shaped by factors such
as neural architecture, environmental statistics, development, and evolutionary pressure.
These factors impose a substrate of cognitive priors onto which new experiences are grafted.
To gain insight into the black box of the human participant’s mind, the cognitive scientist
develops a “diagnostic” lab task to test cognitive theories and to compare participants (e.g.,
patients vs. controls). The way in which the participant performs the task is a function
of the task training as well as their cognitive priors. To yield DNN models that behave
more human-like and can therefore serve as models of human behavior, we here advocate for
an analogous view on DNN models. In particular, we want DNN models that have similar
“cognitive priors” as humans. One way to achieve this is to let the neural architecture
be informed by biological knowledge and to mimic development and evolution by selecting
ecologically relevant training tasks (Section 3). Such a hopefully “human-like” model then
enters the cognitive science lab to be tested like a human; this may involve task-specific
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training on the diagnostic lab task (Section 4).
At this point, the metaphor breaks down, as the cognitive scientist now wants to compare
human and DNN behavior (Section 5) and potentially revise the model by fitting some parts
of the DNN directly to human behavior or even revise the model entirely (Section 6). Toward
the end of the paper, we review some directions to integrate cognitive process models and
DNN models (Section 7).
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The cognitive science lab
hu
m
an
co
gn
iti
ve
pr
oc
es
s 
m
od
el
D
N
N
Diagnostic task
designed for task structure t to behavior model evaluation
model evaluation
EvaluatingFit to human behavior
re
sp
on
se
A B C D
human
re
sp
on
se
A B C D
human
re
sp
on
se
A B C D
humanre
sp
on
se
A B C D
DNN
re
sp
on
se
A B C D
process model
re
sp
on
se
A B C D
DNN
re
sp
on
se
A B C D
DNN
re
sp
on
se
A B C D
process model
re
sp
on
se
A B C D
process model
re
sp
on
se
A B C D
DNN
input input
(pre-)training on ecological function
training on diagnostic lab task
training on human behavior
e.g., Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986
e.g., Botvinick, Matthew, & Plaut, 2006
e.g., Peterson et al., 2019
e.g., Stoianov & Zorzi, 2012
e.g., Roesenboom & Seth, 2019
e.g., Cohen et al., 1990
e.g., Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 2004
a
vs
vs
or
I’inputPriors
Structure
I
training on diagnostic task
training on diagnostic taskevolution and development
e.g., noise parameters, 
encoding model
Architecture
Pre-Training task(s)
Objective Function
I’input
b
Figure 1: A DNN walks into a lab – a metaphor. (a) First row: The human mind is
the result of evolutionary and individual development and learning. Cognitive scientists
devise diagnostic tasks to test computational hypotheses of the mind. Second row: The
architecture, training schedule, and the pre-training tasks are building blocks that shape the
DNN model’s “mind” to become a testable hypothesis of a human cognitive function (Section
3). This function is then being tested by diagnostic lab tasks (i.e., cognitive experiments)
(Section 4). In the process, (parts of) the network may be trained to perform the diagnostic
task (akin to a human that is trained on a lab task) and some aspects of the DNN might
be fit to human behavior (e.g., encoding model parameters or noise parameters) (Section 6).
Rich behavioral measures should be used to evaluate the viability of the model (Section 5).
Third row: In contrast to DNNs, cognitive process models more explicitly define the building
blocks of the model (priors, process structure). They are usually specifically devised for the
diagnostic task and take low-dimensional, hand-crafted representations (I ′) as input. (b) The
proposed research strategy involves three different training stages (pre-training, training on
diagnostic lab task, fitting to human behavior). Different combinations of these have been
employed in the literature.
.
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2 The obvious criticisms
Before we go into the technicalities of making neural networks more useful as models of
human cognition, we will address two broad questions one might have about this research
agenda.
2.1 Do we really need more models in cognitive science?
There is a rich tradition of “hand-crafted” cognitive process models to describe human
behavior, such as evidence accumulation models, associative learning models, and Bayesian
models (reviewed in (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Miller, Barnet, & Grahame, 1995; Ma, 2019),
respectively). Cognitive process models are typically assemblies of simple, interpretable,
and purportedly universal components, such as sensory noise, linear filters, decision criteria,
and error signals. Many cognitive process models are to some extent normative, in the sense
that the decision-maker minimizes a cost function. Cognitive process models typically have
fewer than 20 parameters, and those parameters are usually fitted to individual subjects.
Cognitive process models often require handcrafting feature representations to reduce
the complexity of the input to a few low-dimensional feature dimensions. For example, one
might handcraft a canonical color space and a one-dimensional circular space to represent
the color and orientation features of natural image patches. In planning, one might choose a
set of simple state features to construct a value function (Sutton & Barto, 2018). In terms
of the decision stage of a cognitive process model, modelers typically restrict themselves to
considering a small number of decision rules that are more or less principled. This hand-
crafting introduces potentially unverifiable assumptions and may prevent scaling to more
complex and high-dimensional tasks. These disadvantages are less present in another class
of cognitive models, connectionist models (O’Reilly & Munakata, 2000; Rumelhart, Mc-
Clelland, & PDP Research Group, 1986; McClelland et al., 2010). Such models are neural
networks typically consisting of a few tens to hundreds of artificial neurons. They have been
used as models for a wide range of cognitive tasks, such as past-tense learning (Rumelhart &
McClelland, 1986), the Stroop effect (Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990), and serial recall
(Botvinick & Plaut, 2006). Compared to handcrafted process models, they can learn much
more flexible input-output mappings from data, in particular intermediate, hidden feature
representations. From a modeler’s perspective, this comes with the challenge to understand
the emergent representations. As training neural network models involves gradually chang-
ing parameters, the phenomenology that a neural network displays during training may
serve as a model of development or task learning (Rogers & McClelland, 2004; Rosenberg
& Sejnowski, 1986; Rumelhart, Hinton, & Williams, 1986; Saxe, McClelland, & Ganguli,
2019; Munakata, Mcclelland, Johnson, & Siegler, 1997; Munakata & Mcclelland, 2003; Yer-
molayeva & Rakison, 2014; Lake, Ullman, Tenenbaum, & Gershman, 2017; Orhan & Ma,
2017; Kruschke, 1992). Moreover, manipulating the statistics of the task a neural network is
trained on allows one to systematically study the adaptive value of its mechanisms (Rahwan
et al., 2019; Cichy & Kaiser, 2019; Kietzmann, McClure, & Kriegeskorte, 2018).
Deep neural networks inherit many properties of connectionist models like their dis-
tributed representations or end-to-end training via backpropagation. Technological advances
and larger datasets have allowed them to be trained much deeper and to more complex tasks
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(Schmidhuber, 2015). Most current state-of-the-art DNNs are typically not designed to be
models of human cognition. Yet, we argue in this paper that with some adjustments to the
pipeline, they can become good models of human cognition that complement traditional cog-
nitive process models. On the one hand, cognitive models still have advantages. They allow
for principled testing of specific computational hypotheses, whereas in DNNs, representations
and computation are an emergent property of task-based training. Like in connectionist
models, their computational principles are therefore often harder to understand and inter-
pret than those of handcrafted process models. The attempt to model human behavior with
a neural network has therefore been described by the attempt to substitute one black box
(the human mind) with another black box.
On the other hand, DNNs offers more possibilities than cognitive process models. First,
a researcher is not confined to their imagination: the emergent properties of DNNs some-
times allow for the discovery of solutions that one might not have thought of. Second, DNNs
are routinely trained on tasks that are many orders of magnitude more complex than any
task described by cognitive process models; examples include DNNs for object recognition
(Krizhevsky et al., 2012) and deep reinforcement learning models for chess and Go
(Silver et al., 2018, 2017). Thus, they have the potential to vastly expand the scope of com-
putational modeling in cognitive science, and inspire new cognitive process models. Third,
for cognitive neuroscientists, DNN models promise the ability to “look under the hood”,
i.e. to understand how neural processes may give rise to behavior. Indeed, the emergent
internal representations of DNNs have been shown to be good predictors of neural repre-
sentations in brains (Khaligh-Razavi & Kriegeskorte, 2014; Yamins et al., 2014; Yamins &
DiCarlo, 2016) suggesting that insights gleaned from DNNs can potentially inform cognitive
neuroscience. For these reasons, we believe that DNNs might enrich the cognitive scientist’s
toolbox. Instead of viewing neural networks as a competitor to cognitive process models,
they can complement each other in efforts to understand human behavior. Towards the end
of this paper, we will address ways in which DNN models could be combined with cognitive
process models.
cognitive process
models
connectionist
models
DNN models
tasks applied
to
mostly simple lab
tasks
mostly simple lab
tasks
mostly complex real-
world tasks
number of pa-
rameters
order 1-10 order 10-100 order 103 − 109
optimization to fit human data to a task objective to a task objective
neural data no account potential account potential account
learning tra-
jectory
usually no explicit
account
potential account potential account
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2.2 Does superhuman performance render DNNs irrelevant as a
model of human behavior?
According to the universal function approximation theorem, any sufficiently deep and suffi-
ciently large network, given sufficient training data, learns to approximate any (continuous)
function from input to output arbitrarily well (Cybenko, 1989; Hornik, 1991). Indeed, in
some complex tasks, such as Go (Silver et al., 2017) or detecting breast cancer (McKinney
et al., 2020), DNN performance is superhuman. Doesn’t that make the DNN irrelevant as a
model of human behavior?
We argue that it does not. First, cognitive scientists have long been comfortable with
models that perform better than humans. Namely, ideal-observer models describe how an
observer with full information should behave to obtain maximum performance on a particular
task. In many domains however, human behavior does not follow an ideal-observer model
(e.g. (Tjan, Braje, Legge, & Kersten, 1995)). These models only start to capture human
behavior when augmented with limitations such as encoding noise (Faisal, Selen, & Wolpert,
2008), limited memory (Ma, Husain, & Bays, 2014), or inference approximations (Beck, Ma,
Pitkow, Latham, & Pouget, 2012). Similar to ideal-observer models in cognitive science,
neural networks can provide an upper bound on the performance that can be achieved given
a task and architectural constraints. Modifying a superhuman DNN in order to achieve a
better fit to human behavior could take many forms, including changing the architecture,
the cost function, the learning scheme, or the training data (see also Section 6.1).
Second, “superhuman” is a term that is thrown around quite easily but sometimes reflects
a rather narrow notion of performance. Specifically, DNNs often perform well on tasks similar
to the ones on which they were trained - often on par or better than humans. A sensible
requirement of a “superhuman” model is that it also performs well on tasks and distributions
that are considered similar by humans. Those models, however, very often fail to generalize
outside the distribution and task they have been trained on. In general, DNNs can easily
learn to solve tasks with strategies that are very different from humans (e.g., memorization)
(Zhang, Bengio, Hardt, Recht, & Vinyals, 2016). Unlike humans - such a model will fail
to generalize to new stimuli outside of the training distribution. A striking and prominent
example of a lack of out-of-distribution generalization of DNNs is their vulnerability to
adversarial attacks. Here, targeted, changes of the input that are imperceptible to humans
can yield drastic changes in the output of a DNN (Szegedy et al., 2014). Moreover, DNNs
trained to classify images with a certain noise level fail to generalize to new, untrained noise
levels (Geirhos et al., 2018; Jo & Bengio, 2017). DNNs that play Atari games at or above
human-level performance display catastrophic performance drops when game objects are
shifted by a few pixel compared to the training, demonstrating that these DNNs do not have
an understanding of visual objects in the game (Kansky et al., 2017).
In sum, in some narrow task regimes with large amounts of training data, DNNs are
incredibly good in fitting input-output relationships to an extent that may be superhuman;
then, making the DNN more human-like is still interesting and potentially challenging. How-
ever, more often, DNNs do not even perform at human levels when performance is considered
broadly.
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3 Designing and training more human-like DNN mod-
els
Building DNN models requires the researcher to select configurations in a large space of
modeling dimensions. How should the architecture of a DNN be designed, which task(s)
should be used to train the network, what should be the cost function (Marblestone, Wayne,
& Kording, 2016), and what should be the training procedure? We here focus on exploring
this space with the long-term goal of building DNN models that behave like humans on
ecologically valid tasks.
3.1 Architecture and objectives
On the architectural side, more biologically plausible neural networks may yield more human-
like behavior. The basic functionality of DNNs is loosely inspired by biological neuronal
networks and it is unclear what level of biological realism is necessary to yield models dis-
playing human-like behavior. However, in general, moving DNNs towards more biologically
realistic modes of processing has seemed to be a viable strategy so far. For instance, in-
stead of using deep feedforward networks that might have hundreds of layers, recurrent
neural networks with lateral and feedback connections in shallower networks yield more
human brain-like representations and behavior (Kubilius et al., 2019; Spoerer, Kietzmann,
& Kriegeskorte, 2019; Kietzmann et al., 2019). Feedback connections are ubiquitous in the
human visual system and are thought to support generative inference (Clark, 2013) and
DNNs that perform generative inference display robustness to adversarial stimuli (Schott,
Rauber, Bethge, & Brendel, 2018). These models are particularly interesting to both cogni-
tive scientists and machine learning researchers as they promise an account of self-supervised
learning of the input from unlabeled data (He´naff, Razavi, Doersch, Eslami, & Oord, 2019).
Other potential directions involve separating excitatory and inhibitory neurons (Song, Yang,
& Wang, 2016), spiking neural networks (Tavanaei, Ghodrati, Kheradpisheh, Masquelier, &
Maida, 2018), oscillations (Reichert & Serre, 2013), sparsity constraints (Boutin, Franciosini,
Ruffier, & Perrinet, 2019), attention (Lindsay & Miller, 2018; Kruschke, 1992), more bio-
logically plausible learning rules (Lee, Zhang, Fischer, & Bengio, 2015; Lillicrap, Cownden,
Tweed, & Akerman, 2016), and more biologically plausible cost functions (Marblestone et
al., 2016).
While DNNs excel at learning input-output relationships from data, they tend to struggle
in learning models from data that flexibly map input to variables. This may put models at
an advantage that allow for relational structures (Battaglia et al., 2018), relational memory
(Santoro et al., 2018), and dynamic mapping of information via attention (Bahdanau, Cho,
& Bengio, 2014; Luong, Pham, & Manning, 2015), transformer networks (Vaswani et al.,
2017), spatial transformers (Jaderberg, Simonyan, Zisserman, et al., 2015) or more explicitly
build them in like Capsule networks (Sabour, Frosst, & Hinton, 2017; Hinton, Sabour, &
Frosst, 2018). While these new DNN mechanisms are highly interesting to machine learning
researchers, it remains an open question whether their applications in DNNs will also entail
a better fit to human behavior.
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3.2 The importance of tasks
Finding the right tasks to train networks is critical, as tasks are the experiences that shape the
computations and representations in a network (Richards et al., 2019). In cognitive process
models, prior experiences may be captured by explicit priors to represent the statistics of
the world which the brain has adapted to (Geisler, 2008), or implicit priors imposed by the
structure of the cognitive process model. By contrast, computations in standard DNNs are
an emergent property of learning; DNNs are usually not equipped with explicit priors. In
addition, implicit priors imposed by the architecture do not necessarily line up with the
structure of the task. Instead, during task-based training, a neural network is learning the
computational processes and the priors from experience. This means that in order to yield
similar representations, computations, and priors as the human brains, special care has to
be taken to expose the DNN to the “correct” experiences (i.e., task set).
There are two issues that determine whether a particular task imposes the same kind
of solution space on a function that a DNN should learn as evolution and real-world task
demands have imposed on the human cognitive function that we want to model. The first is
complexity: computational solutions may drastically differ when faced with higher complex-
ity and many solutions may not scale up from low- to high- complexity regimes. Each task
can be solved by a variety of different computational solutions, even more so if the task has
low complexity and the potential solution space is large (e.g., a large DNN). Hence, a DNN
trained on a overly simplified toy version of a task may learn a particular computational
strategy that is unlike the human solution or does not generalize to the real-world complex-
ity of the task. Hence, it is crucial to use tasks that approach real-world complexity or to at
least show that a neural network function is able to scale up to real-world complexity. The
second is modularity (Yang, Cole, & Rajan, 2019): in humans, a particular function might
not only support a single task but may be optimized to support multiple tasks. To attain
such a functional modularity, it might be necessary to train DNNs on multiple tasks. We
now explore three aspects of task training that may address these challenges of complexity
and modularity: richer training sets, pre-training with ecologically valid task, and multi-task
training.
3.3 Richer training sets
The universal function approximation property of DNNs makes them powerful statistical
pattern detectors. With adequate training, they are able to detect and exploit systematic
relationships in the training distribution and generalize well to stimuli from the same distri-
bution (i.e., typically the held-out test data). However, generalization beyond the training
distribution often fails spectacularly, as discussed above. Moreover, a large body of research
on object classification DNNs has shown that DNNs can pick up any subtle correlation in
the data to solve the tasks and that these may be very different from those used by humans
to perform the same task (Ilyas et al., 2019; Lapuschkin et al., 2019). Such “cheats” are
discovered if those subtle correlations are specific to the training dataset and revealed in new
datasets where those correlations do not hold (Barbu et al., 2019).
One approach to sidestep the problem of insufficient out-of-distribution generalization
is to enrich the input distribution. Such data augmentation techniques are standard in
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the training of DNNs (Shorten & Khoshgoftaar, 2019). For instance, in image recognition,
the training dataset can be enhanced by identity-preserving transformations such as scaling,
rotation, or adding noise to the stimulus. The DNN is then trained to give the same response
to those augmented samples as the original sample. This approach does not solve the problem
of generalizing beyond the training distribution. However, given sufficient rich training
distributions (e.g., training on a wide variety of noise levels and variations of the input), this
may yield models which perform well enough on new stimuli which are “close enough” to
the training distribution to allow for generalization.
The strategy of enriching the input distribution does not just make for better learning
but also might bring DNNs closer to humans in their learning experience. The human
experience is characterized by large input variability: functions such as object recognition
have to be robust across an enormous range of different input noise levels, lighting condition,
viewpoints, rotations, occlusions – all occurring during dynamic changes in the input due to
external, self-, and saccadic motion. Hence, training DNNs on stimuli like videos (e.g., on
head-mounted cameras (Sullivan, Mei, Perfors, Wojcik, & Frank, 2020)), which approach the
variability which humans were exposed to during evolution and development, might yield
models with human-like robustness (Hasson, Nastase, & Goldstein, 2020).
3.4 Pre-training with ecologically valid tasks
An attractive and the arguably most promising approach to build DNN models of human
behavior is to train models to perform the same tasks as humans and to analyze similarities
and differences in their behavior (Yamins & DiCarlo, 2016). Whether this approach will yield
success crucially depends on the task. Models tend to be trained from scratch to perform
a particular task (e.g., digit classification). In contrast, human brains are the result of
evolutionary and developmental optimization on ecologically valid tasks. These pre-existing
representations and processes shape how they learn new tasks. For instance, when faced with
a new task (e.g., an experimental task in a cognitive science lab) humans might perceive a
connected group of pixel on a lab monitor as an object or an agent, and use intuitive physics
and intuitive psychology inference (Lake, Salakhutdinov, & Tenenbaum, 2015) to learn to
perform this task. Untrained DNNs do not have any of these prior experiences and therefore
learn new tasks using potentially vastly different strategies.
Hence, to yield DNNs that behave and learn similarly to humans, it might be necessary
for models to be exposed to a similar kind of ecological pre-training. The human brain is
optimized for adaptive behavior in a dynamic and complex environment. Hence, requiring a
similar pre-training for DNNs is a daunting task that might be fulfilled only in the long-term.
However, all is not lost. Identifying ecologically valid sub-tasks that a modular structure of
the human brain is performing might suffice in many situations (Richards et al., 2019). For
example, the most successful class of DNN models are based on image classification DNNs.
The success of this approach in finding behavior similar to humans and neural representations
similar to the primate ventral stream (Khaligh-Razavi & Kriegeskorte, 2014) likely results
from the fact that object recognition is a ecologically valid task that the brain (i.e., the
ventral stream) has been optimized for during the course of evolution and development.
Ultimately, one research goal may be to identify ecologically valid brain tasks their success
in inducing human-like behavior of DNNs trained on them.
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3.5 Multi-task training
The human mind certainly is not dissociated into separable sub-functions that can each be
purely taxed by a single task. Instead, multiple cognitive functions subserve performance
in the same task and the same cognitive function is used across multiple tasks. Hence,
attempting to identify a singular task to train a DNN may be a inherently limited approach.
Instead, one can train a DNN on a set of multiple tasks that are thought to rely on a common
set of sub-functions (Sinz, Pitkow, Reimer, Bethge, & Tolias, 2019; Yang, Cole, & Rajan,
2019; Collobert & Weston, 2008; Zamir et al., 2018). This multi-task training demands
sharing of representations and computations across all tasks in a DNN. This, in turn, may
support the emergence of modular sub-functions that yield human-like generalization and
robustness (Yang, Joglekar, Song, Newsome, & Wang, 2019; Caruana, 1998).
A DNN can be trained on multiple tasks simultaneously by interleaving them in the
training set. Alternatively, tasks can be trained sequentially. A particular case in which
humans learn sequentially is when they start from smaller and simpler tasks and build up to
more complex tasks. Inspired by this, curriculum learning (Bengio, Louradour, Collobert, &
Weston, 2009) attempts to structure training tasks in a way that may allow neural networks
to learn faster and yield more human-like representations and behavior.
Training DNNs to perform multiple tasks is an active field of research in machine learning
(Ruder, 2017). Neural networks are faced with a particular challenge during sequential learn-
ing, as they tend to “catastrophically forget” previously learned tasks when being trained
on new tasks. However, recent progress in continual and transfer learning (Csurka, 2017;
Parisi, Kemker, Part, Kanan, & Wermter, 2019) has outlined promising strategies to over-
come catastrophic forgetting, for example by avoiding changes to weights that are important
for previously learned tasks (Kirkpatrick et al., 2017).
3.6 Inter-individual variability
A defining nature of human cognition is its variable instantiation across different individ-
uals. A rich tradition of inter-individual psychology research has described how humans
vary in their abilities, preferences and characteristics of information processing. So far, little
effort has been made to model inter-individual differences in human abilities using DNNs.
One way to model this would be to train multiple instances of the same DNN architecture
with different initialisations (Rajalingham et al., 2018; Colunga & Smith, 2005; Mehrer,
Spoerer, Kriegeskorte, & Kietzmann, 2020), different amounts or orders of experiences (i.e.,
training samples), different learning schedules, architectural variations (e.g., different num-
ber of neurons), or variations in cost functions (i.e., different weighting of exploration and
exploitation).
4 Testing DNN models like human subjects
Once a trained DNN enters the cognitive science lab, it is as much a black box as a human
subject. The scientist’s goals are to characterize the behavior of the DNN and to compare
it with humans. To achieve these goals, they can use the same experimental tasks as they
use to probe a particular cognitive function in human subjects (Ritter, Barrett, Santoro, &
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Botvinick, 2017). Because such tasks are generally different from the tasks used for ecological
pre-training of DNNs, we will refer to them as diagnostic tasks. Diagnostic tasks are typically
more carefully designed than test tasks in machine learning. For example, stimulus selection
in cognitive science tends to be less arbitrary than in machine learning, and often involves
parametric variation. Cognitive scientists who try to understand DNNs would do well to
import their tried-and-true experimental methods rather than to adopt the tests common
in machine learning. In this section, we discuss how experimental techniques from cognitive
science can be applied to DNNs, and how a DNN can be adjusted to perform the diagnostic
task. In the next section, we will ask how to compare DNNs to humans when both have
completed a diagnostic task.
4.1 Stimulus selection
Experimental approaches that are commonplace in cognitive science are not yet widely used
for testing DNNs. This is particularly apparent in the selection of stimuli. Stimulus selection
is necessary because the space of all possible inputs is often intractably large (e.g., a high-
dimensional pixel space). In machine learning, one might attempt to test the DNN on a
representative sample from the relevant stimulus distribution (e.g., a collection of photos).
By contrast, a cognitive scientist would sample stimuli in a range where human behavior
is most sensitive to variations (i.e, dynamic range) or most informative about the cognitive
function of interest. This selection process can be informed by cognitive theories or previous
experiments. Cognitive scientists have begun to apply the same approach to DNNs. For
example, DNNs have been tested on stimuli that induce special percepts in humans, like
illusions (Zeman, Obst, Brooks, & Rich, 2013; Watanabe, Kitaoka, Sakamoto, Yasugi, &
Tanaka, 2018) or perceptual completions (Tang et al., 2018). Another important component
of experimental design in humans is the parametric variation of stimulus variables. Such
variation has in recent years also been applied to DNN training and testing. For example,
in images, one can vary noise level (Geirhos et al., 2018; Wichmann et al., 2017), clutter
level (Chen, Roig, Isik, Boix, & Poggio, 2017), contrast (Geirhos et al., 2018; Leibo et al.,
2018; Wichmann et al., 2017), or motion coherence (Leibo et al., 2018). A stimulus selection
approach that is inaccessible in the study of humans is to find stimuli that best distinguish
the responses of different DNN models (Golan, Raju, & Kriegeskorte, 2019).
4.2 Adjusting a pre-trained DNN for a diagnostic task
We have advocated for pre-training a DNN on tasks that the human brain is optimized
to perform (Yamins et al., 2014; Richards et al., 2019). This however might yield DNN
outputs that are hard or impossible to compare to human behavior. For example, the cost
function during pre-training may involve semi-supervised training (Stoianov & Zorzi, 2012)
such as minimizing its own prediction error under a internal generative model of the world
on ecologically realistic stimuli (Lotter, Kreiman, & Cox, 2017; Hinton, Dayan, Frey, & Neal,
1995). Prediction errors cannot be measured directly in human behavior. Hence, in these
cases humans and DNNs need to be compared on another task (i.e., the diagnostic task) such
as perceptual discrimination or recognition. Parts of the pre-trained network may therefore
need modification or retraining in order to perform the diagnostic task. This stage therefore
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corresponds to humans and models - both with their individual pre-training - being trained
to perform the diagnostic task in the lab.
Recall that a researcher would like to make a claim about the human-like behavior of the
pre-trained DNN. In particular, one would like to claim that the combination of architecture,
cost function and pre-training gave rise to computations and representations that generalize
to human-like behavior on the diagnostic task. However, given sufficient modification and re-
training, any pre-trained DNN might very easily fit the diagnostic task perfectly - unlike the
human subjects. In this case, the diagnostic task would become an uninformative measure
of human-like behavior of the pre-trained network. Hence, retraining should be done with as
little as possible training data from the diagnostic task, potentially considering a human-like
amount of diagnostic task training. In addition, only the architectural modifications that
are necessary to perform the task should be applied and trained. For example, one might
train the weights of a simple linear classifier that maps from the higher-level representation
of the (now fixed) pre-trained network to the response categories of the diagnostic task (e.g.
(Stoianov & Zorzi, 2012)).
5 Evaluating the similarity between DNN and humans
By now, a DNN has participated in our diagnostic laboratory task and produced data.
We then want to characterize how its behavior differs from that of humans, just like an
experimental psychologist might compare groups of humans. This requires us to decide
what metrics to use for comparison.
5.1 Behavior beyond accuracy
In machine learning, DNNs are often evaluated using a single metric, such as classification
accuracy or playing strength. The approach of the cognitive scientist should be different. A
DNN might achieve the same accuracy as a human observer in the same task, but with a
very different pattern of errors. Therefore, we need to characterize behavior in richer detail
than using overall accuracy. The more detailed the characterization, the stronger the test of
the DNN as a model of human behavior.
How can we achieve this? The relationship between the response r of a human or a DNN
to a stimulus s can be formalized by an input-response distribution p(r|s). The response r
could be multi-dimensional, for example, consisting of a decision, a confidence rating, and
a time series of eye fixation locations. Across repetitions of the same stimulus s, humans
typically vary in their response; this response variability is captured by p(r|s). Neural
networks can be made similarly stochastic, for example through a softmax read-out, using
bayesian neural networks (Gal & Ghahramani, 2016), or by injecting noise at an earlier stage.
The most comprehensive metric to compare human and stochastic DNN behavior would
be based on the full response distribution p(r|s): DNN behavior is similar to human behavior
if for each stimulus, their conditional response distributions are similar:
phuman(r|s) ≈ pDNN(r|s). (1)
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Formally, dissimilarity could be measured by the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence (Cover &
Thomas, 2012) between phuman and pDNN. KL divergence is a “distance” between probability
distributions and is related to statistical deviance. Minimizing the KL divergence between
data and a model is equivalent to maximizing the log likelihood of the model.
Using KL divergence as a metric may, however, not always be desirable. First, KL
divergence is often difficult to estimate. Second, KL divergence would not reveal how the
DNN and the human differ, only by how much. The full input-response distribution of
humans and models is determined by a wide range of factors, and some of them might be
subordinate to the phenomenon studied from the perspective of the researcher; for example,
human response variability may result from factors such as attentional lapses or motor errors
that may be “uninteresting” to a researcher interested in object recognition. Considering only
projections of the input-response distribution, i.e., summary statistics, allow the researcher
to focus on the aspects of the input-response distribution which are most relevant for the
research question at hand. Therefore, to answer the “how” question, we need a suite of
summary statistics of behavior.
5.2 The cognitive scientist’s toolbox
Cognitive scientists already have a toolbox of summary statistics that can be applied to DNNs
(Fig. 2). A summary statistic is computed from p(r|s) by some combination of aggregating
across different s, aggregating across different r, and summarizing the distribution by a
scalar. Below we list summary statistics that are potentially useful for comparing human
and DNNs.
Accuracy and confusion matrix. In a classification task, overall accuracy is a coarse
summary statistic, as it lumps together different true classes (Fig. 2a). More informative
is a confusion matrix, which specifies for each true class the probability that the human
or the DNN responds any class (Kheradpisheh, Ghodrati, Ganjtabesh, & Masquelier, 2016;
Rajalingham et al., 2018) (Fig. 2b); a high off-diagonal probability means that one class
is easily mistaken for another. Adversarial attacks focus on a row in the confusion matrix
where the DNN has a high off-diagonal entry but humans do not (Fig. 2c). In human
behavioral experiments, it is possible to obtain a variant of the confusion matrix by asking
subjects to judge the similarity between pairs of classes (Jozwik, Kriegeskorte, Storrs, &
Mur, 2017; Peterson, Abbott, & Griffiths, 2016). Subjective similarity is then treated as
a proxy for the probability of a confusion error; however, unlike confusion matrices, the
resulting “similarity” matrix is necessarily symmetric. Some studies have tested whether
DNNs are subject to the same illusions as humans, such as the Mu¨ller-Lyer illusion (Zeman
et al., 2013) or illusory motion (Watanabe et al., 2018). Not unlike an adversarial attack,
an illusion can be considered a systematic misperception of the stimulus, i.e. a specific off-
diagonal element in the confusion matrix (Fig. 2d). When stimulus parameters are varied,
one could plot visual classification accuracy or the confusion matrix as a function of those
parameters (Geirhos et al., 2018; Wichmann et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2017; Leibo et al., 2018;
Wichmann et al., 2017), and the slope of such a psychometric curve represents the observer’s
sensitivity to the parameter (Carnevale, de Lafuente, Romo, Barak, & Parga, 2015; Mante,
Sussillo, Shenoy, & Newsome, 2013; Song, Yang, & Wang, 2017; Stoianov & Zorzi, 2012).
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Figure 2: The cognitive scientist’s toolbox. Humans and models can be compared via
accuracy (a) or confusion matrices across stimulus classes (b). Particular stimuli, such as
adversarially pertubed stimuli (c) and illusiory stimuli (d) induce specific confusion patterns.
Via parametric manipulation of stimuli one can compare psychometric curves (e, f). Receiver
operator characteristic (g). Process model ranking (h): a process model is a family of
distributions pθ(·|s) (indicated by a black line and gray dotted circles). Moving along the
black line could correspond to fitting nuisance parameters θ (e.g., a lapse parameter) to
maximize the likelihood of a response vector r (e.g., responses of a model and human in
blue and yellow respectively). In the case of isotropic pθ(·|s), pML(r|s) under the maximum
likelihood model (indicated by solid circle) can intuitively be understood as the distance of
r to the model family in response space. These model distances induce a process model
ranking (i) which can be compared for humans and models.
.
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Receiver operating characteristic. Accuracy and response probabilities are not only
affected by stimulus features, but also by varying the relative rewards associated with a
correct response across classes or by varying the base rates of the classes (Greene, Baldassano,
Esteva, Beck, & Fei-Fei, 2016). In binary classification, these manipulations allow one to
plot the hit rate against the false-alarm rate; the resulting curve is called a receiver-operating
characteristic and can be compared between human and DNN (Lerer, Gross, & Fergus, 2016)
(Fig. 2g). An alternative way to obtain a receiver-operating characteristic is to ask for a
confidence rating in addition to a class response. However, confidence ratings can also be
compared between human and DNN on a trial-by-trial basis, and this is potentially more
informative.
Reaction times. Processing in DNNs lacks a sensible notion of time, as the “hardware”
differs between brains and computers. In contrast to feedforward models, recurrent neural
networks do have a notion of sequentiality in processing and can be constructed to trade
off speed and accuracy in their decision making (Spoerer et al., 2019). To model human
reaction times using DNNs, one might provide the (noise-augmented) output of a DNN as
input to an evidence accumulation process (Ratcliff, 1978) to simultaneously model choices
and reaction times. A subsequent scaling and shifting of the DNN reaction times can then
fit this distribution to human reaction times (Cohen et al., 1990).
Learning trajectory. So far, we have discussed comparing behavior of a trained network.
However, one can argue that the learning curve itself should be included in the comparison
between DNN models and humans (Ratcliff, 1990). Specifically, DNNs tend to need large
numbers of labeled examples. This is an unrealistic model of human learning (Lake et al.,
2017). To do better, each of the summary statistics discussed above can be measured along
the learning trajectory. For example, one could require that a DNN model does not only
match human accuracy after training, but also during training when presented with the
same training examples as the human. In practice however, it is difficult to establish what
training examples humans receive during development. Nevertheless, DNNs can replicate
inductive biases found in humans, such as the shape bias in object recognition (Colunga &
Smith, 2005; Feinman & Lake, 2018; Ritter et al., 2017). Along similar lines, in the realm of
perceptual learning, DNNs can be tested for the same qualitative properties as observed in
humans, such as increased specificity (Wenliang & Seitz, 2018). Other efforts that focused on
learning dynamics have moved beyond conventional DNNs to unsupervised training (Anselmi
et al., 2016; Eslami et al., 2018; Flesch, Balaguer, Dekker, Nili, & Summerfield, 2018; Lotter
et al., 2017; Stoianov & Zorzi, 2012; Watanabe et al., 2018) or to architectures with strong
prior knowledge (Lake et al., 2015).
5.3 Advanced techniques
Using cognitive process models as tools. So far, we have discussed model-free ways
of characterizing behavioral data. We could go a step forward by fitting a cognitive process
model to both the DNN data and human data, and comparing the parameter estimates
(Wang et al., 2016). A similar approach is common in computational studies of development
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or psychiatric disorders. If more than a single cognitive process model is available, we have
an additional possibility: fit all such models to both sets of data, use a goodness-of-fit metric
such as AIC, and compare the rankings of the process models on this metric between DNN
and human (Orhan & Ma, 2017) (Fig. 2h,i).
Turing test. Humans and DNNs can be put in “generative” mode, in which they produce
samples (such as images or speech) from a given class label – e.g. “draw a rabbit” (Fan,
Yamins, & Turk-Browne, 2017; Lake et al., 2015). For comparing human and DNN behavior
on such tasks, the challenge is that the generated samples are typically high-dimensional.
Similarity could be evaluated using a Turing test (Turing, 1950): a human observer could
be presented with samples generated by a human and samples generated by a DNN, and
try to tell them apart (Lake et al., 2015). Success is achieved when the judge is at chance.
The Turing test bypasses the explicit formulation of a summary statistic, but relies on the
judge to implicitly use whatever information is available to tell the difference. The judge
in a Turing test does not need to be human; it could also be another DNN that is trained
to adjudicate between human and machine generated samples. In generative adversarial
training, such a judge can be pitted against a generative DNN that is trained to increase its
ability to fool the judge (Li, Gauci, & Groß, 2016).
6 Increasing the similarity between DNN and humans
The outcome of the aforementioned procedure of testing and evaluating DNNs and humans
most likely revealed differences in human and model behavior. (If not, the researcher has
probably not explored the input space thoroughly enough.) The cognitive scientist will want
to seek out and characterize the conditions in which a DNN fails to characterize human
behavior. Then, in a revision step, the researcher wants to obtain a better DNN model of
human behavior (last column in Fig. 1b). This can be done in different forms, which we will
discuss below.
In this process, it might be helpful to identify some “clean”, standardized, fully open
data sets of human participants performing a diagnostic task. Such a data set can serve
as a diagnostic benchmark for DNN models of human behavior. This notion should not be
confused with that of benchmarks in machine learning. There, a benchmark task typically
is a set of input stimuli (e.g., images) and corresponding normative outputs (e.g., labels of
object classes) on which a DNN is trained. This DNN is then evaluated on a held-out part of
the same dataset. In this case, the same task is used for both training and testing the model,
and the goal is to improve DNN task performance. By contrast, a diagnostic benchmark
should not serve as a full training set for a DNN model (besides minor modifications, see
section 4.2) but as a diagnostic test of human-like behavior. In section 6.2, we discuss how
a DNN could be directly fit to behavioral data; this notion is closer to the notion of a
benchmark in machine learning.
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6.1 Iterative improvement of task-trained DNNs
Once we have trained a DNN on a (diagnostic) task and compared it to human behavior
on the same task, we may want to increase its similarity to human behavior, i.e. bring the
DNN closer to the ultimate goal expressed in Eq. (1). There are myriad ways of doing so.
At a coarse performance level (i.e., accuracy), a DNN may potentially differ from humans by
exceeding them. In this case, one could for example decrease its number of layers, decrease
the number of units per layer, limit its number of training examples, impose regularization
on activity or weights, inject noise, implement working memory or attentional limitations,
or entirely change its architecture. Even if DNN performance is human-like at a coarse level
of task performance, any of these manipulations could bring pDNN(r|s) as a whole closer to
that of humans, phuman(r|s) at the level of more nuanced evaluation of model and human
behavioral similarity (see section 5). After every change, one would retrain the network on
the task and again evaluate. One could iterate this process, either within a single study or
across studies, thus effectively implementing a global search in the space of all DNNs, driven
by maximizing the similarity to human behavior.
6.2 Fitting DNNs directly to behavioral data
The question arises whether the process of increasing similarity to human data could be
sped up by performing neural architecture search (Zoph & Le, 2016) or fitting a single
DNN directly on human data, instead of training it to perform a task well. Training on
human behavior directly may provide a powerful tool to learn human-like priors. The hope
is that DNNs would not just learn a complicated mapping between a particular stimulus
and a particular human response (error). Instead, it might be easier for a neural network to
develop internal priors that are similar to those human priors which gave rise to the human
response (errors) in the first place.
Just like in cognitive process modeling, one could fit the parameters of a DNN to the
human behavioral data (either trial-to-trial or aggregated). Note that training on a task
is equivalent to fitting to the data of an omniscient observer, but obviously human data
are different. Using behavioral data only at the model evaluation stage and fitting DNNs
directly to human behavior are both extreme cases of how and when human data is used
to inform a model. Fitting to behavioral data could be done at different stages of model
building, training and testing, corresponding to the four rows in the matrix of Fig. 1b that
contain a purple box. We will now discuss examples of these four cases separately.
First, task-specific training could be followed by a stage of training on a smaller human
behavioral dataset (bottom two rows of the matrix). One way to increase the similarity of
DNN and human behavior is to fit some parameter of the model to human behavior (Cohen
et al., 1990). For example, DNNs trained with cross-entropy are often over-confident in their
decisions (Guo, Pleiss, Sun, & Weinberger, 2017). Hence, one may want to fit scaling and
shift parameters of the softmax output of a DNN to match the human data (Golan et al.,
2019).
Alternatively, one could altogether replace the task-specific training by fitting human
data directly, while keeping the ecological pre-training intact (fifth row). For instance,
salience prediction models attempt to predict the spatial distribution of human fixations
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on still images (Bylinskii et al., n.d.; Kummerer, Wallis, Gatys, & Bethge, 2017). Others
have fitted additional weights to match DNN and human similarity spaces (Peterson et al.,
2016), judgments (Battleday, Peterson, & Griffiths, 2017), and time perception (Roseboom
et al., 2019).
Finally, one could replace both the ecological pre-training and the task-specific training
by fitting human data directly (third row) (Peterson, Battleday, Griffiths, & Russakovsky,
2019). However, the more one replaces task training by fitting to human data, the more one
has to confront the typical limitations of behavioral data sets and the resulting redundancy
in DNN models of those data. In particular, the main reason that this approach is rarely
used is that we would expect a powerful DNN to fit the input-response distribution (see
section 7.2 for DNNs as upper bounds). Success would be neither surprising nor necessarily
insightful from the cognitive scientist’s perspective. Hence, if training DNNs directly on
behavior one needs to evaluate the model on different data or criteria. For example, the
behavioral data may become part of the pre-training and the pre-trained DNN would then
be compared to human behavior on diagnostic benchmarks that were not part of the training
set. Alternatively, one might be interested in additional evaluation criteria, such as the
similarity of the model to neural representations or how easy it is for specific architectures
or learning regimes to fit the behavioral data. Finally, large-scale behavioral experiments in
which tasks are gamified may generate sufficiently large human data sets (e.g. (Mitroff et
al., 2015)) that fitting a DNN to those data becomes non-trivial.
7 Towards a closer interplay between DNN models and
cognitive process models
In the previous sections, we have explored how to train, evaluate, and revise DNNs to make
them plausible models of human behavior. With this in mind, we would like to return to
the relation with cognitive process models that we introduced in Section 2.1.
7.1 Towards more complex tasks
Before we can have any conversation about how the two types of models can be compared
or combined, we need to use tasks in which both types of models are interesting. We have
advocated for ecologically pre-training of DNNs (see Fig. 1b). If one were to follow this, then
standard tasks in cognitive science (e.g., random dot motion discrimination, Treisman-style
visual search, the Stroop task, or the two-step task in planning) can be used as diagnostic
benchmarks in the testing phase, often without modification. However, we believe that solely
using such tasks would be a missed opportunity.
Whereas cognitive science has long aspired to explain naturalistic behavior, it has in
practice been much more conservative and used extremely simple and controlled tasks (Fig.
3b). DNNs are able to perform much more complex tasks, approaching real-world complexity
in many domains, and as we argued in Section 3.2, rely on sufficiently complex pre-training
to make them appropriate models of human behavior. We argue that this should serve as an
encouragement to be more ambitious and build cognitive process models of more complex
tasks. For example, while visual search is well understood and modeled for controlled lab
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tasks with mostly simple stimuli (Palmer, Verghese, & Pavel, 2000; Wolfe & Horowitz,
2017), it is less clear how those models would operate in complex real-world scenes. Object
localization is a standard task in computer vision for DNNs. Both cognitive and DNN models
could be challenged by matching human search behavior in more complex and dynamic visual
scenes (Wolfe, Alvarez, Rosenholtz, Kuzmova, & Sherman, 2011).
In the realm of perceptual organization, excellent models exist for determining whether
two line segments, separated by an occluder, belong to the same contour (Geisler & Perry,
2009), but models of detecting ownership in the presence of an arbitrary number of stacked
occluders (Pitkow, 2010) have not been tested in humans. Although occlusion stimuli that
allow for cognitive modeling would likely still have to be simpler than full images as used
by image segmentation DNNs, they would be a huge step up in complexity and naturalness,
and they would be not be trivial for DNNs.
A similar story applies to the cognitive science of planning. Here, the most popular
traditional tasks have a state space complexity of the order of 1 to 10 (van Opheusden &
Ma, 2019), but can handle complexity as high as 1016 (van Opheusden, Galbiati, Bnaya, Li,
& Ma, 2017), which is a step closer to much more complex planning tasks that have been
used to train DNNs (Silver et al., 2017; Mnih et al., 2015; Silver et al., 2018; Vinyals et al.,
2019).
In conclusion, the success of DNNs on tasks that are orders of magnitude more complex
than those traditionally used in cognitive science hopefully pushes the field in developing a
new set of more complex tasks that are challenging for both cognitive process models as well
as DNNs (Fig. 3b). Doing so can additionally serve as a catalyst for cognitive science to
move towards the long-term goal of explaining human behavior in the complexity of the real
world.
7.2 DNNs as an upper bound for goodness of fit
A promising practical way to use DNNs fitted to human behavior is as an approximate
upper bound on the goodness of fit of cognitive process models. Such an upper bound exists
because behavior is intrinsically variable, even when the input is kept constant (Wichmann
& Hill, 2001); this upper bound is analogous to the “noise ceiling” in models of fMRI activity
(Lage-Castellanos, Valente, Formisano, & De Martino, 2019). Specifically, the log likelihood
of a model can never exceed the negative entropy of the data (Cover & Thomas, 2012).
However, this entropy is notoriously difficult to estimate (Wichmann & Hill, 2001; Shen &
Ma, 2016), especially when an experiment features non-repeated stimuli or a large number of
response options on each trial. When the behavioral data set is sufficiently large, a trained
DNN should offer a good practical approximation to the negative entropy, thus allowing
cognitive modelers to estimate the “absolute goodness of fit” of their model.
7.3 Directly comparing both types of models
Beyond using DNN models as a tool for bounding goodness of fit, we can take them more
seriously and allow ourselves to reject a cognitive model if it loses the competition with a
DNN model. This, is, however, conceptually more complicated. The current instantiations
of DNNs and cognitive process models provide different kinds of explanation of behavioral
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data. DNNs provide high-dimensional and often hard-to-interpret explanations of how the
interaction of elemental operations give rise to complex behavior. By contrast, cognitive
process models provide explanations at the conceptual and algorithmic level. These differ-
ences should give us pause when directly comparing models of both classes. If a DNN fits
a particular human data set consistently somewhat better (in terms of log likelihood or a
related metric) than a cognitive process model, this does not necessarily mean we should
discard this model altogether. For example, higher interpretability of the cognitive model
could overcome a small difference in goodness of fit compared to a DNN. Conversely, cog-
nitive process models may learn faster and generalize better (i.e., more human-like) than
DNNs on particular tasks as they may be equipped with sophisticated domain knowledge
(e.g., an in-built physics engine for mental simulation) that a DNN has to learn from data
(Battaglia, Hamrick, & Tenenbaum, 2013). Here, the lower similarity to human behavior of
a DNN may be accepted in favor of a higher potential for relating the model to neural data.
The trade-off between goodness of fit and other model qualities such as interpretability,
neural plausibility, or the importance of learning representations from data are hard to
pinpoint and quantify and depend on one’s personal utility function for models. Therefore,
we consider this a grey area, but we think it is important for researchers to state and discuss
this utility function.
7.4 Hybrid models
The scientific adversarial challenge between cognitive process models and DNNs may create
a state in which a task can not satisfactorily be solved by neither model class. Examples
could be tasks with high complexity (thereby challenging classical cognitive process models)
but also relying strongly on human prior knowledge (e.g., intuitive physics or common sense
reasoning, (Lake et al., 2015)) that tends to be hard for DNNs to learn from data alone.
Instead of considering DNNs and cognitive process models as contenders we can poten-
tially combine their strengths and form “hybrid models” of human behavior. The differences
between DNNs and cognitive process models can be leveraged to our advantage. We will
now discuss such opportunities for synergy.
One obvious way is to learn representations with a DNN on an ecologically valid task.
In a second step, the representations learned by the DNN can then be used as input to a
cognitive process model (e.g. a categorization model (Battleday, Peterson, & Griffiths, 2019)
or a model of time perception (Roseboom et al., 2019)).
Cognitive process models are limited in the task complexity they can describe by the
fact that representations need to be hand-crafted. However, neural networks have also
been used to learn analytically intractable likelihood functions and approximate posteriors
in probabilistic graphical models (Bengio, De Mori, Flammia, & Kompe, 1992; Johnson,
Duvenaud, Wiltschko, Adams, & Datta, 2016; Kingma & Welling, 2013; Rezende et al., 2014)
and in a categorization task in a non-human primate (Walker, Cotton, Ma, & Tolias, 2020).
Neural networks can therefore be used to learn mappings from a high-dimensional input to
a low-dimensional model at the latent, cognitive level (Fig. 3a). In general, complementing
neural networks with process-model like algorithms such as tree-search can help equip neural
networks with capabilities that they would otherwise not learn from task-based training
(Silver et al., 2018) and therefore be a powerful approach for strong artificial intelligence.
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Figure 3: Towards a closer interplay between DNNs and cognitive process models. (a) DNNs
tend to be more complex than other models but are able to learn representations from
data. Cognitive process models provide low-dimensional and interpretable models of human
behavior. However, they require hand-crafted representations (I’). Combining both DNNs
and cognitive process models may allow to learn mappings onto structured representations
and therefore combine the strength of both worlds (DNN-enhanced cognitive process models).
(b) A multi-faceted account of a cognitive phenomena that includes cognitive process models
and DNNs presupposes that both model types are able to explain the same tasks. Complex
tasks are intractable for simple models, in particular for cognitive process models (green) and
low-dimensional connectionist models (blue) (1), but simple tasks may omit the potential of
DNNs (blue) for real-world complexity tasks (2) and easily be overfitted by complex models.
Hence, there is a large, mostly unexplored, space of tasks of intermediate complexity (3)
that poses challenges for both model classes and may foster new model developments such
as DNN-enhanced cognitive process models (red).
.
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There are a variety of other ways to combine DNNs and cognitive models. For instance,
process models are the current standard for a model-based understanding of the behavior
of the black-box which is the human mind. The same tools and can be used to better
understand the black-box which is a trained DNN (Orhan & Ma, 2017; Wang et al., 2016)
(see section 5). Yet, another way to use process models is to equip DNNs with inductive
biases that are implemented by cognitive process models. For example, (Bourgin, Peterson,
Reichman, Griffiths, & Russell, 2019) pre-trained a DNN with a synthetic dataset generated
by cognitive model and then fine-tuned the network on actual human data.
8 Concluding remarks
While connectionist models have been part of the cognitive scientist’s toolbox for decades,
their more powerful and popular cousin, deep neural networks, are only starting to enter
the cognitive science lab. They are intriguing starting points for modeling human behavior
for their ability to achieve human-level performance on complex, real-world tasks, as well as
for their promise to bridge the algorithmic and implementational levels. We here outlined
what a research agenda may look like to turn DNNs into good models of human behavior.
We emphasized the distinction between pre-training on ecologically relevant tasks (including
multi-tasking), followed by narrow training on the lab task. We then recommended using the
exploration of richer tasks than common in cognitive science, as well as a rich suite of metrics
to evaluate the similarity of human and DNN behavior. We discussed steps to increase this
similarity, including fitting parts of the DNN directly to human data.
We list several challenges and open questions for this research agenda in Box 2. Some of
these address the scope of the data that a DNN should account for (individual differences;
representation of probability; neural and behavioral data jointly), others the training of
a DNN for the benefit of cognitive science (task-based training or direct fit to the data;
incorporating biological detail), and yet others the types of tasks used (“toy tasks”; embodied
tasks). Finally, two questions are broader model comparison questions (diagnostic power of
behavior; fair comparison).
9 Glossary
• Cognitive process model: A cognitive process model provides a mathematically
specified mapping from input stimuli to subject behavior (responses, reaction times,
eye movements, etc.) by combining simple, general building blocks of cognition, such
as sensory noise, decision noise, priors, utility functions, and transformation rules (such
as linear filters in visual processing). Each component typically comes with one or more
parameters that are unknown to the experimenter. The standard way to fit a cognitive
process model is to maximize the likelihood of its parameters. The likelihood of a
parameter combination is the probability of generating the observed data (responses)
under that parameter combination. For details, see (Wilson & Collins, 2019).
• Connectionist model: An artificial neural network designed for the purpose of study-
ing cognitive phenomena. Connectionist models (also known as parallel distributed
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processing, PDP, models) produced widespread interest in the 1980s and 1990s and
have traditionally used much shallower architectures than current DNNs and employed
a higher variety of learning algorithms, activation functions. The research agenda in
this paper could also be termed “new” or “neo-neo” connectionism (Chauvet, 2018)
it combines the research paradigm of connectism with the computaitonal power and
advances of current DNNs (Buckner & Garson, 2019).
• Deep neural network (DNN): Umbrella term for an artificial neural network with
a large number of hidden layers, each of which applies a sequence of simple linear and
nonlinear operations to the activity in the previous layers. One example are convolu-
tional DNNs where information is integrated spatially local with weight sharing across
space. Information flows from input to the output either once (feedforward DNN) or
can flow in both directions between hidden layers (recurrent DNN) where it can display
complex dynamics. Recent advances like self-attention have expanded the DNN toolkit
by context-dependent computations. In DNNs trained for classification, each output
unit corresponds to a particular response class (e.g. target presence or object class).
Current DNNs are almost exclusively trained by modyfing model weights using back-
propagation of errors on a large number of training examples; DNNs are usually trained
end-to-end with supervision by providing only inputs and desired outputs (e.g., correct
image labels) during training, hence no manual engineering or domain knowledge is
needed. The expressive power of the DNN derives from the number of transformations
(i.e., layers or recurrent time-steps).
• Deep reinforcement learning: A type of DNN that does not get trained using
labeled examples, but using information about the positive or negative outcome of an
action or action sequences – such as when winning a game. Might employ Monte Carlo
tree search, a method to assess a current state (!assess the value of a potential action?)
by simulating futures until an outcome is obtained.
• Features: Very often, the input is richer and higher-dimensional than needed for a
task. For example, the number of pixels in an image is much higher than the number
of categories that humans use for perceptual categorization. Thus, a modeler has to
commit to a way of reducing the input to a set of task-relevant features. In cognitive
process models, this is often done manually, based on intuition. DNNs, on the other
hand, learn the features (this is also called representational learning) automatically as
a part of optimizing task performance.
• Task: A set of stimuli combined with a prescription for how the agent should map
those stimuli to a response. More generally, a mapping between a set of inputs (e.g.,
images) and a set of responses (e.g., labels or images).
• Task-based training: DNNs generally are optimized to perform a particular task.
Given sufficient training data and DNN complexity, they can achieve arbitrarily good
performance (universal function approximation (Cybenko, 1989; Hornik, 1991)). This
is different to cognitive process models which are fit to explain human behavior.
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• Recurrent neural network (RNN): A DNN in which units have time-varying acti-
vation states and information can flow in cycles, e.g., bottom-up (from input to output),
top-down (output to input), or lateral (within the same layer) across time. RNNs are
particularly useful for time-varying sequential input but can also process static input.
By ’unfolding’ a RNN, it becomes equivalent to a DNN with residual connections and
weight sharing across time (Liao & Poggio, 2016) and can be trained using the same
methods as feedforward DNNs. Hence, computationally, a RNNs trades of network
depth with time and often more closely corresponds to human behavior and neural
data than correspondingly deep networks.
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Outstanding questions
• A future for task-based training for higher cognition? Inductive biases like con-
volution and hierarchical processing that have been used in computer vision (partly)
coincidentally led DNNs to develop solutions similar to brain solution in object recog-
nition. Inductive biases like attention or graph neural networks (Battaglia et al., 2018;
Vaswani et al., 2017) promise to yield success in more ’higher’ cognitive tasks that re-
quire compositionality and flexible mapping of inputs to internal models of the world.
Will these ’new’ inductive biases similarly lead to coincidentally human-like solutions?
• How can individual differences be captured in DNN models? In comparing
DNNs with humans, it is common to consider average human performance or to pool
human data. Humans, however, have individual differences, Following cognitive process
models, a DNN that purports to be a good model of human behavior should provide an
account of individual differences. What will a DNN account of human inter-individual
variability look like?
• What is the role for toy tasks in neural network modeling? In this review, we
have advocated for cognitive tasks of higher complexity, primarily to pose challenges to
human observers similar to the ones that machines have struggled to solve. This does
not mean that we see no role for simple tasks and accompanying simple models. A
toy task can represent the essence of a broad class of more complex or more real-world
tasks. Understanding human or neural network behavior in a toy task can give us
insights that generalize far beyond those tasks. However, we believe that “representing
the essence” and generalization should not be taken for granted. Scaling a task up
in complexity (number of objects, number of interactions amongst objects, size of the
state space, demands from other tasks, etc.) might force the brain or a neural network
to use fundamentally different algorithms. In a given domain, what are the limitations
of toy tasks and would scaling up task complexity make sense?
• How sensitive are the emergent DNN models to their biological detail?
Incorporating more biological detail into DNNs will most likely increase their ability
to display human-like behavior and internal activations. However, how ’smooth’ is
this space of biological realism - i.e., will small, critical changes in biological realism
yield drastically different solutions or can we hope to adequately approximate human
behavior and neural data by networks with very rudimentary biological detail?
• How may an account of probabilistic representations look like in a DNN?
Perceptual psychology has taught us that the human brain seem to represent un-
certainty or even full probability distributions (reviewed in (Ma & Jazayeri, 2014))).
Bayesian probabilistic programs naturally incorporate this information (Lake et al.,
2015), and probabilistic representations also emerge in trained shallow networks (Orhan
& Ma, 2017), but does this generalize to DNNs (Kendall & Gal, 2017) and can different
types of uncertainty be distinguished (Gal & Ghahramani, 2016)?
• What are the limits of behavioral tests to discern between different models?
How far do we get with behavioral testing alone to adjudicate between competing
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models? This is already an important problem for cognitive process models but even
more so for DNNs, as they are typically highly overparametrized. To what extent can
models show the same detailed behavior but use very different algorithms and neural
activations?
• Will fitting DNNs to human behavior directly yield more human-like mod-
els? In reference to Section 6.2, can we expect more human-like out-of-distribution
generalization from training DNNs directly on (large-scale) human behavior instead of
the task optimal behavior?
• What are the prospects for simultaneous fitting of a DNN to behavioral
and neural data. Task-optimized DNNs are routinely “opened up” to examine the
similarity of their internal representations to those of biological neurons. The same
post-hoc analysis can be applied to a DNN optimized to match human data. Go-
ing further, what are the prospects for simultaneous fitting of a DNN to behavioral
and neural data (Turner, Rodriguez, Norcia, McClure, & Steyvers, 2016; McClure &
Kriegeskorte, 2016; Kietzmann et al., 2019)?
• What would a fair comparison between cognitive process models and DNNs
look like? When assessing the quantitative fit to human behavioral data, how should
we weigh model complexity, the amount of training data, or the amount of incorporated
domain knowledge when comparing cognitive process models and DNNs? In addition,
the direct comparison of cognitive process models and DNN models remains rife with
philosophical tension, relating to differing notions about the meaning of understanding
(Cichy & Kaiser, 2019).
• Towards embodied DNNs? If we take the title of this paper way more seriously than
anyone should, it could serve as a reminder that embodied cognition is still an under-
explored area both in cognitive science and AI. Several ongoing projects try to endow
virtual DNN agents with bodies that have to navigate environments (Beattie et al.,
2016; Savva et al., 2019). Physical whole-body motor control (Wolpert, Diedrichsen, &
Flanagan, 2011) is even harder as well as the eventual integration of multiple cognitive
functions such as perception and planning with motor control, such as in playing sports
(Kitano, Asada, Kuniyoshi, Noda, & Osawa, 1997).
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